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SEA BASING: EVOLUTIONARY NAVAL DOCTRINE AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

WHY SEA BASING
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) both outlines the current security requirements for the nation and provides for the goals of transformation to meet the challenges of the future.
The QDR states "The purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces is to protect and advance U.S. national interests and, if deterrence fails, to decisively defeat threats to those interests." 1 Accordingly, the QDR requires the military to "increase the capability of its forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent effect." 2 Sea Basing is one concept that supports this without being totally dependent on other nations for basing privileges. Additionally, "U.S. forces will fight from forward deterrent postures with immediately employable forces, including long-range precision strike capabilities …and rapidly deployable maneuver capabilities." 3 These are precisely the capabilities the Navy and Marine Corps' concept of Enhanced Networked Sea Basing will provide to the nation and Joint Force Commanders. The Secretary of Defense has stated that he wants "fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace." 4 Perhaps inadvertently, the Secretary is generally describing the capabilities the Sea
Basing concept promises. The Secretary asserts that the nation has a strategic imperative for transformation to meet the asymmetric threats of our potential adversaries. Sea Basing allows the United States to maximize our nation's asymmetric advantages to ensure no future adversary will be able to threaten the nation's security by denying us access. This Strategic
Research Project (SRP) examines the evolutionary development of Sea Basing, perhaps the most transformation of all the Service concepts. A better understanding of the evolution of Sea
Basing provides insight about the transformation process. Even with Sea Basing's transformation capabilities, after twelve years of thought and development it still does not provide the nation everything desired for future operations. Yet, the potential of Sea Basing provides the future Joint Force one of its most powerful options for decisive victory.
WHAT IS SEA BASING?
To understand the concept of Sea Basing, we must first distinguish between Sea Basing and sea-based forces. Sea-based forces represent the historic root of the Sea Basing concept.
Indeed, sea-based forces have been associated with military operations since the Vikings.
These maritime people used their knowledge of navigation and seafaring skills to project their influence from northern Europe to the Americas. The Vikings raided the coast of modern-day Ireland and England for the goods and resources needed to support their life style. The Viking's unprecedented mobility allowed them to move almost at will throughout much of the North Atlantic, both conducting raids and extending trade. The Vikings always maintained a link to the land, although their capability was primarily sea-based. Sea Basing, however, posits that a maximum amount of force capability will be left afloat rather than moved ashore. Ideal Sea
Basing would allow forces to live at sea indefinitely, conducting all functions there that are normally done on land.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF WORLD WAR II
The most significant advances in sea-based forces toward the concept of Sea Basing were demonstrated by U.S. naval campaigns in the Central Pacific during World War II. "This geography meant that the logistic support for our fleet during operations in the Central Pacific would have to be primarily afloat, in what developed into the mobile service squadron" 5 concept.
Admiral Nimitz's initial plan for the Central Pacific campaign was to use one mobile service squadron to support the fleet and, as advance bases were taken, to propel another mobile service squadron ahead, in effect leapfrogging the fleets' support from one advance base to the next. 6 This was a visionary concept in and of itself; indeed many skeptics in the Navy doubted the capabilities of afloat service support, and the concept of underway refueling was still relatively new. 7 Nonetheless, for the first time the world would see a nation project its power around the world on ships and aircraft. Few elements were missing from what would evolve into the modern concept of Sea Basing. "The advantages of logistics afloat and near the fleet operating area had long been recognized by many naval commanders. This support from advance bases and from floating mobile service squadrons and groups maintained the fleet and enabled it to take offensive action farther from home supply points than was ever before thought possible." 8 At the start of World War II, the U.S. Navy's Base Force Train, which provided logistics support to the fleet, had a total of 51 craft to support the fleet; by the end of the war this number had grown to 315 vessels of all types and sizes. 9 Assault forces would conduct landings under the cover of massive naval surface fire and air support. These assault forces would establish a beachhead in order to bring fire support, command and control, and logistic support ashore.
Logistics in the Pacific was sustained by hundreds of noncombatant ships following just behind the fighting fleets and assault forces, provided by three mobile service squadrons: Six, Eight, and Ten. Squadron Eight brought the supplies from the United States and transferred them to Squadron Ten, which in turn transferred the food, fuel and ammo over to Squadron Six, which followed immediately behind the fighting fleets. 10 All supply transfers were done at sea, and This allows assault forces to be husbanded so only those objectives that directly contribute to defeating an adversary need to be taken. Assault forces will still be supported by an umbrella of naval air and surface fires to support the assault, but the assault force will move directly from the sea-base to the objective. It will not have to stop or slow down to establish a beachhead in order to bring fire support and logistics ashore. The sea-based forces' networked command and control will remain afloat, allowing for real-time decision management, control, and self synchronization, without the need to be physically ashore to manage the battle. Once the assault force has taken its objective, it will then return to the sea-base for reconstitution, an effort that in the past had to be accomplished ashore and in locations distant from the area where the next assault would occur. Recalling the island-hopping Pacific operations of World War II, it is easy to comprehend the speed, power, and flexibility that the Sea Basing concept brings to the current military capability of the United States.
SEA BASING DEFINED
The Sea Basing concept, like any good concept, is continually evolving. Basing will be, think beyond a single ship or platform to a family of naval platforms 14 that have been developed in such a way as to be able to work independently of each other or as part of the total Sea Base infrastructure. This family of platforms will be able to mass effects, to increase sensor coverage and force protection capabilities while projecting both offensive and defensive power. 15 The Sea Base, with the capabilities associated with Sea Shield, with its mobility and its location off shore provide an inherent security that a fixed land-based site can never achieve.
Sea Basing places at sea to a greater extent than ever before these interrelated battlefield operating systems: logistics, command and control, fire support, and maneuver forces. 16 The Sea Base "will leverage information to achieve efficiencies and provide support at the time and place of greatest impact…shifting to anticipatory responsive logistics" 17 that are linked in command and control and in cargo handling technologies, so logistics can be performed afloat and on the move. Sea Basing is not just about logistics, but logistics is one of the key innovations and requirements of the concept. With Sea Basing's inherent logistics capability, any Service's force will be able to be sustained for long periods of time and great distances from the continental United States. The "web of connectivity turns individual ships into elements of a dispersed but integrated force,…from which the commander exercises control in secure and mobile facilities accelerating the speed,…and action at every level of command." 18 Sea Basing, by keeping afloat the maximum amount of fire support possible, increases the speed at which maneuver forces can operated, and frees them of the requirement to maintain ashore security for these fire support assets.
ENHANCED NETWORKED SEA BASING
Enhanced Networked Sea Basing (ENSeabasing) is the next step in the evolution of the Sea Basing Concept: "An enhanced networked sea base will provide the transformational capabilities that expand the naval services' abilities to preclude and counter the actions of increasingly creative, adaptive and lethal adversaries." 19 Sea Basing thereby contributes to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in either static or dynamic operations. Static operations rely primarily on logistics, while dynamic operations rely on maneuver. 20 Enhanced Networked Sea
Basing is defined as:
"The integrated capabilities resident in a family of systems and assets afloat that maximize the projection of all dimensional naval power both at sea and ashore. It is a quantum leap forward in naval power projection capabilities through phased at sea arrival and assembly, selective offload, and reconstitution at sea using netted dispersed forces, enabled by FORCEnet, which facilitates joint operations across the range of military operations." 21 ENSeabasing, in simple terms, will allow for: phased at sea arrival and assembly, selective offload, integrated power projection, persistence and sustainment, fully networked command and control, and reconstitution at sea. These combined capabilities are no small order. They place great demand on both the technology needed to support the concept as well as the commander and staff's ability to imagine how this will all work together as part of the total sea base. First, consider what phased at-sea arrival brings to the force. Currently, forces require long lead times as they prepare to deploy. Then once deployed, they must assemble in the theater of operation. Deployment of forces may depend on a host nation's willingness to support U.S. lead efforts. U.S. forces using Sea Basing will deploy via strategic lift assets, and then assemble at the Sea Base. These forces will conduct collaborative planning enroute, so that they will be more rapidly available to execute missions once they arrive in theater. Upon arrival at the Sea Base, the forces will not be required to move their supplies ashore; they can remain afloat in relative safety, awaiting further guidance from the Combatant Commander or President. Once the President decides to commit forces, the flexibility of selective offload will allow the Joint Force Commander to send ashore only those forces required. These forces will be fully tailored to the mission task they are to perform. The assault forces will move directly from the Sea Base to the objective, free of the security requirement for their combat support and combat service support assets. Most of the maneuver force's fire support will remain afloat, enabling the force to maneuver under the umbrella of precision weapons and networked fire support provided by the Sea Strike capabilities of the joint force's Sea Base. The force's maneuverability will also be unencumbered by the need to create a large logistics base ashore, since the Sea Base is designed to provide the precision logistics support required. At-sea replenishment capability allows the force and Sea Base to remain on station for the duration of the mission. Sea Basing minimizes the times supplies have to be moved, providing a faster and more responsive supply chain. 22 Once the mission has been completed, the force will move back to the Sea Base for reconstitution in preparation for the next mission.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEA BASING CONCEPT
The development of the Sea Basing concept is just one stop in the long road of NavyMarine Corps operational concepts over the last twelve years. The period since 1990 has been perhaps the most productive period in development of strategic maritime doctrine since Mahan wrote his books on sea power in the early 1900s. There are several reasons for this, but passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) and the fall of the Soviet Union have contributed significantly to the doctrinal surge and the evolution of Sea Basing.
In the mid-1980's, the GNA was passed into law. A watershed event in national security legislation, GNA has had a direct impact on the development of doctrine and strategy. In broad terms, GNA mandated joint action among the services and the development of Joint Warfare.
One of the unintended consequences of the law was that it forced the Navy and the Marine Corps to rethink their relations. Regardless of their prior inter-service relations, GNA clearly required the two maritime services to get in sync and cooperate more effectively.
Another important event for concept development occurred when the Soviet Union From the Sea explains that Naval Expeditionary Forces will be "structured to build power from the sea and sustain support for long term operations." 24 Moreover, it declares that these forces will be "unrestricted by the need for transit or over flight." 25 Perhaps its two most visionary statements in regard to Sea Basing are: "Focusing on the littoral area, the Navy and Marine
Corps can seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base or coastal air base to allow the entry of heavy Army and Air Force forces." 26 Then From the Sea goes on to predict that "Sea lift will provide the maritime bridge to ensure heavy joint forces can arrive and fight effectively in major crisis." 27 From the Sea further notes that "Naval forces also contain crisis through forward operations and rapid response with flexible and sustainable sea based forces." 28 In eight short, bring Sea Basing to the forefront of maritime concepts. 34 The four fundamental strategic strengths of the Naval Services are; decisiveness, sustainability, responsiveness, and agility.
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In order to accomplish these inherent strengths in the future, Naval Power 21 states that "Sea Basing provides force protection, C4ISR, fires, and logistics capabilities that support versatile and flexible power projection, and enables highly lethal forces to move directly from ship to operational objectives deep inland." 36 This assertion solidifies the Sea Basing concept as one of the cornerstones of future maritime and joint capabilities.
MARINE CORPS STRATEGY 21
In 41 The goal of Sea Basing is to provide the JFC with "global command and control" and "accelerate expeditionary deployments and employment timelines by prepositioning vital equipment and supplies in-theater." 42 The Sea Base will allow the U.S. military unparalleled speed of action and allow our forces to be in place before an adversary can fully engage his antiaccess capabilities. The "Sea Basing concept provides a valuable tool for prioritizing naval programs" 43 both in support of the naval services and in support of the JFC.
EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE
Recent development of naval concepts has been fueled by the Marine Corps' revolutionary thinking and concept development. The Marine Corps' publication of the "Ship to
Objective Maneuver" concept paper, transformed the oceans of the world into maneuver space to be used by any nation with the technical capability to exploit this unfriendly environment. This tactical and operational capability is linked to the strategic vision of Marine Strategy 21, through the capstone concept of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW): "EMW is the union of Marine Corps core competencies; maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary heritage; and the concepts by which it organizes, deploys and employs forces." 44 EMW calls for the Marine Corps to provide; "joint and multinational enabling, strategic agility, operational reach, tactical flexibility, and support and sustainment." 45 The Marine Corps provides these capabilities to the JFC as an "integral component of a larger naval force" 46 from a secure Sea Base.
In EMW, the Sea Base is expected to provide "networked platforms and promote interoperability among the amphibious task force, carrier battle group, and maritime preposition forces," 47 and new high speed air and surface craft." 61 Further, "The Sea Base expands and contracts to match mission requirements by incorporating the full range of Naval Forces" 62 and the joint force. "In the far term, Sea Basing will provide an increased ability to protect, project, and support joint and multinational forces…and will become a single, fully netted force to enhance the sped and effectiveness of expeditionary warfare." 63 In order to support the forces on the move self-synchronization, the Sea Base enabled by, "ForceNet will create an adaptable command and control network capability that will make naval platforms the location of choice from which future JFC's direct operations."
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WHAT SEA BASING PROVIDES THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC)
The Sea Base provides the bridge between the operational preparations of the battle space, conducted by special operations forces, and the campaigning force. One of the stated goals of the maritime concepts is to "extend the persistence and staying power of our forward deployed naval forces, and facilitate as well the presence, staying power and operations of our fellow Services." 65 ENSeabasing provides this capability. American forces can operate from submarines or amphibious ships that are able to quickly respond to a crisis. While the Sea Base grows to it full potential offshore, these advance forces develop the intelligence picture.
The integrated, networked command and control capability of the ENSeabase allows the JFC to establish his headquarters afloat, including elements of his component headquarters. As the crisis escalates, the maritime force moves units ashore to secure the critical infrastructure that allows the campaign forces to arrive and go into combat. These forces are supported by the fire support assets which remain afloat on the ENSeabase. Just as with the World War II Mobile Service Squadron Ten, whose duties were to "furnish similar logistic support to Navy and Marine shore-based units…as well as Army units which may be prescribed and it will furnish such services and supplies as any of our armed forces thereat may require," 66 ENSeabasing will provide the JFC the logistical support needed to enable the advance and early arrival forces.
WHAT SEA BASING IS NOT
Sea Basing will not allow the United States to completely free itself of all overseas basing requirements. It will relieve much of the pressure on our overseas allies by allowing many U.S. forces to return home. The U.S. will still need preposition stocks of certain types of equipment in forward sites. The U.S. will also still need forward base access which provides air facilities where strategic lift aircraft can land and transfer U.S. forces to theater lift capabilities like the High Speed Vessel, which then transfer the force to the ENSeabase.
The ENSeabase will not provide the JFC all the required equipment to completely transition from the enabling force to the campaign force. Due to their size and bulk some items will still need to be staged in forward regions, such as bulk liquid equipment, engineer equipment, decontamination equipment, material handling equipment, mine warfare equipment, construction materials, and long-shelf-life medical stores. These hard-to-move items are Offshore Base. 67 Another concept, presented in this SRP, is to use several networked multimission ships that combine the capabilities of the current twenty-five ship requirement into three or four ships. 68 This concept has the advantage of greater mobility with each ship having the ability to operate independently until need for the ENSeabase. Regardless, to make Sea Basing a reality, we need new platforms to allow for networked command and control, long range fire support, and the ready inspection and maintenance of equipment while at sea.
Currently equipment on the MPF and amphibious ships is combat loaded, which does not allow for the level of maintenance required to reconstitute the force afloat.
SEA BASING IS THE FUTURE
This SRP describes the development of Sea Basing over the last 12 years. The capabilities Sea Basing will provide future JFC match those desired by the SecDef and President of the United States. Unfortunately, current technology has not caught up with the capabilities envisioned in the concept. We must continue to develop such technologies like those that would facilitate transfers of equipment in high sea states and afloat reconstitution capabilities because of their potential military advantage in Sea Basing. Sea Basing will not be the only capability required by the nation; it will not completely free the U.S. from the need for overseas base access. But it will reduce the nation's dependence on overseas bases and allow the JFC a flexible and agile capability to hold enemies in abeyance until the heavy campaign winning forces arrive on the scene. Once the full potential of the Sea Base is reached, U.S. military forces will be able to move faster than any potential adversary can react. The deterrent effect this will have on the nation's enemies will save the lives of America citizens and service members in future conflicts. The capabilities of Sea Basing as a corner stone joint concept will also ensure the dominance of American military power until space technologies overcome its capabilities to project power abroad. Sea Basing is perhaps the most important naval and joint military concept of this uncertain era in which we live.
WORD COUNT=6,116 67 The idea of using a Mobile Off-Shore Base (MOB) was first discussed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the early 90's. This concept uses structures built with offshore oil platform technology. To create a MOB several of the huge platforms are linked into a facility large enough to land C-130 transport aircraft. The MOB would be able to move as separate pieces and assembly off the coast of an adversary. Only a few MOBs would be built due to the huge cost and each was envisioned as a national asset. Although technologically feasible, uncertainty remains about the MOB's ability to operate in the higher sea states and the ability of the platforms to link together. The concept remains valid and U.S, Joint Forces Command produced a concept paper Joint Sea Basing (Draft) 9/4/2003 which presents a MOBcentric view of Sea Basing. 68 Jon R. Olson, LCDR, USN, "An Alternative Vision of Sea Power 21," Proceedings, October 2003. This article discusses the potential of using three ships to conduct the four tenants of Sea Power 21. One of the ships would be about the size of a current nuclear aircraft carrier using unmanned combat aircraft (UCAV) and provide the home for the embarked landing force. The second ship would be similar to the Littoral Combat Ship and provide the force with fire support, air defense, and command and control. The third ship would be a submarine like platform that could penetrate the enemies antiaccess capabilities, strike targets and insert Special Forces.
